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Abstract 
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a semi-trusted proxy to 
convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into an 
encryption of the same message intended for Bob. Song Luo, 
Jianbin Hu, and Zhong Chen presented a novel ciphertext 
policy attribute-based proxy re-encryption (CP-AB-PRE) 
scheme. The ciphertext policy realized in their scheme is AND-
gates policy supporting multi-value attributes, negative 
attributes and wildcards. We propose a new access policies 
based on LSSS matrix access structures. Our scheme still have 
the properties of both PRE and CP-AB-PRE, such as 
unidirectionality, non-interactivity, multi-use, allows the 
encryptor to decide whether the ciphertext can be re-encrypted 
and allows the proxy to add access policy. Furthermore, our 
scheme can be modified to outsource the policy of W2. 
Keywords: Proxy Re-encryption, Attribute-Based Encryption, 
Ciphertext Policy, matrix access structures 
1. Introduction 
After Boneh and Franklin [1] proposed a practical 
identity-base encryption (IBE) scheme, Green and 
Ateniese [2] proposed the first identity-based PRE (IB-
PRE).A proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme allows a 
proxy to translate a ciphertext encrypted under Alice’s 
public key into one that can be decrypted by Bob’s secret 
key. The proxy may be an untrusted third party. PRE 
was used in many scenarios. Imagine that one day you 
are on a business trip and is inconvenient to access your 
email. You would wish to have the mail server forward 
your encrypted email messages to your secretary Bob, 
who can then read the message using his own or new 
private key. Once Alice comes back, the proxy was 
asked to stop transferring the emails. Difference with the 
traditional proxy decryption scheme, PRE does not need 
users to store any additional decryption key, in other 
words, any decryption would be finished using only his 
own secret keys. But in our scheme, the User2 need 
some Auxiliary key.  
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a generalization of 
IBE. The data provider can express how he wants to 
share data in the encryption algorithm itself. Goyal, 
Pandey, Sahai, and Waters [3] further clarified the 
concept of Attribute-Based Encryption. There are two 
kind of ABE schemes, key policy ABE (KP-ABE) and 
ciphertext policy ABE (CP-ABE) schemes. In KP-ABE 
schemes, ciphertexts are associated with sets of attributes 
and users’ secret keys are associated with access policies. 
In CP-ABE schemes, the situation is reversed. That is, 
each ciphertext is associated with an access policies. CP-
ABE have three kind of access structure. Cheung and 
Newport [4] use AND-gates as the access strategy, for 
the first time proved the security of CP-ABE mechanism 
under DBDH assumption. Bethencourt, Sahai, and 
Waters [5] use the tree structure to realize Fine-Grained 
access control strategy. Waters [6] use LSSS access 
structure       under DPBDHE (decisional Parallel 
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent) hypothesis. We can 
implement proxy re-encryption in ABE schemes, as 
ABE is the development of IBE. But it is not a trivial 
work to apply proxy re-encryption technique into 
attribute based system. Song Luo, Jianbin Hu [39] 
proposed a novel ciphertext policy attribute-based proxy 
re-encryption (CP-AB-PRE) scheme. The ciphertext 
policy realized in their scheme is AND-gates policy 
supporting multi-value attributes, negative attributes and 
wildcards. 
Our Contributions We present a ciphertext policy 
attribute-based proxy re-encryption (CP-AB-PRE) 
scheme using matrix access structure. The ciphertext 
policy realized in our scheme is matrix access policy, 
which also supporting multi-value attributes, negative 
attributes and wildcards. It is more convents to control 
the attributes of User2, and realize the policy of W2 
more efficiently. Our scheme inherits the following 
properties of PRE mentioned in [2, 7]: 
– Unidirectionality. Ueser1 can delegate decryption 
rights to User2 without permitting her to decrypt User2’s 
ciphertext. 
– Non-Interactivity. User1 can compute re-encryption 
keys without the participation of User2 or the private key 
generator (PKG). 
– Multi-Use. The proxy can re-encrypt a ciphertext 
multiple times, e.g. re-encrypt from User1 to User2, and 
then re-encrypt the result from User2 to User3.In this 
process, the computation would increase, but not 
exponent increasing.  
Our scheme has the other three properties: 
– Secret Key Security [7]. A valid proxy designated by 
User1, other users who are able to decrypt User1’s 
ciphertext with the help from the proxy cannot collude to 
obtain User1’s secret key. 
– Re-encryption Control. User1 can decide whether the 
ciphertext can be re-encrypted. 
– Extra Access Control. When the proxy re-encrypts 
the ciphertext, he can add extra access policy to the 
ciphertext. 
– Re-outsourcing. In our scheme, the User1 can finish 
the process of proxy. If we omit the proxy, not only 
User1but also User2 would increase the amount of 
computation. We will use the third party. We can also 
outsource the policy of  . 
Related Work Sahai and Waters [8] first proposed 
Attribute-based encryption and later clarified in [3]. The 
first CP-ABE scheme was put forward by Bethencourt, 
Sahai, and Waters [5]. Their scheme allows the 
ciphertext policies to be very expressive, but the security 
proof is in the generic group model. Cheung and 
Newport [4] raised a provably secure CP-ABE scheme 
which is proved to be secure under the standard model. 
Further on, their scheme supports AND-Gates policies 
which deals with negative attributes explicitly and uses 
wildcards in the ciphertext policies. Goyal et al. [9] put 
forward a bounded ciphertext policy attribute-based 
encryption in which a general transformation method 
was proposed to transform a KP-ABE system into a CP-
ABE one by using “universal” access tree. However, the 
parameters of ciphertext and private key sizes will grow 
up in the worst case. The first secure CP-ABE scheme 
was presented by Waters [6], which supported general 
access formulas. Lewko et al. [10] present a fully secure 
CP-ABE scheme by using the dual system encryption 
techniques [11, 12]. 
 
There are also many other ABE schemes. Multiple 
authorities were introduced in [13] and [14]. K.Emura et 
al. [15] introduced a novel scheme using AND-Gates 
policy. In their scheme, it has constant ciphertext length. 
Hiding access structure in attribute-based encryption is 
also a problem. T.Nishide et al. [16] gave a method to 
solve. Attribute-based encryption was enhanced by 
R.Bobba et al. [17] with attribute-sets which allow same 
attributes in different sets. N.Attrapadung et al. [18] 
proposed dual-policy attributebased encryption which 
allows key-policy and ciphertext-policy act on encrypted 
data simultaneously. Matthew Green,Susan Hohenberger 
and Brent Waters [19] proposed the concept of 
outsourcing, which had relationship with the proxy(third 
party). It can also be regard as the expansion of the PRE. 
Recently, predicate encryption was proposed by Katz, 
Sahai, and Waters [20] and furthered by T.Okamoto et al. 
[21].  
 
        Mambo and Okamoto [22] first introduced the notion of 
PRE. Later Blaze et al. [23] presented the first concrete 
bidirectional PRE scheme which allows the key holder 
to announce the proxy function and have it applied by 
untrusted third parties without further involvement by 
the original key holder. These schemes all had multi-use 
property. The first unidirectional and single-use proxy 
re-encryption scheme was presented by Ateniese et al. 
[7]. Boneh, Goh and Matsuo [24] described a hybrid 
proxy re-encryption system based on the ElGamal-type 
PKE system [25] andBoneh-Boyen’s identity-based 
encryption system [26]. In 2007, Green and Ateniese [2] 
provided identity-based PRE but their schemes are 
secure in the random oracle model. Chu et al. [34] 
proposed new identity-based proxy re-encryption 
schemes in the standard model. Matsuo [27] proposed 
new proxy re-encryption system for identity-based 
encryption, but the scheme needs a re-encryption key 
generator (RKG) to generate re-encryption keys. Libert 
and Vergnaud [28] proposed a traceable proxy re-
encryption system, in which a proxy that leaks its re-
encryption key can be identified by the delegator. After 
the present of ABE, Guo et al. [29] proposed the first 
attribute-based proxy re-encryption scheme, their 
scheme is based on key policy and bidirectional. Liang 
et al. [30] proposed the first ciphertext policy attribute-
based proxy re-encryption scheme which has the above 
properties except re-encryption control. 
 
Organization The paper is organized as follows. We 
give necessary background information and assumptions 
in Section 2. We present our scheme and secure model, 
then construct and give a proof of security in Section 3. 
Discuss a number of extensions of the proposed scheme 
in Section 4.  
2. Preliminaries 
2.1 Bilinear Maps 
Let   and   be two multiplicative cyclic groups of 
prime order p. Let g be a generator of   and       
   be a bilinear map with the properties: 
1. Bilinearity: for all      an      , we have       
 (     )          . 
2.  Non-degeneracy:         . 
We say that   is a bilinear group if the group operation 
in  and the bilinear map          are both 
efficiently computable. 
 
2.2 Access Structure  
Definition2 (Access Structure [31]) Let {          }be 
a set of parties. A collection    {       }is monotone 
if     : if     and     then    . An access 
structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a 
collection (resp., monotone collection)  of non-empty 
subsets of{          }, i.e.,    
{       }. The sets 
in  are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in   
are called the unauthorized sets. 
In our context, the role of the parties is taken by the 
attributes. Thus, the access structure A will contain the 
authorized sets of attributes. We restrict our attention to 
monotone access structures. However, it is also possible 
to (inefficiently) realize general access structures using 
our techniques by defining the “not” of an attribute as a 
separate attribute altogether. From now on, unless stated 
otherwise, by an access structure we mean a monotone 
access structure. 
2.3 LSSS and Monotone Span Programs[6]： 
In a linear secret-sharing scheme [31], realizing an 
access structure A, a third party called the dealer holds a 
secret y and distributes the shares of y to parties such that 
y can be reconstructed by a linear combination of the 
shares of any authorized set. Further, an unauthorized set 
has no information about the secret y. 
There is a close relation between LSSS and a linear 
algebraic model of computation called monotone span 
programs (MSP) [32]. It has been shown that the 
existence of an efficient LSSS for some access structure 
is equivalent to the existence of a small monotone span 
program for the characteristic function of that access 
structure [31, 32] 
2.4 Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman 
Exponent Assumption [6] 
We define the decisional q-parallel Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman Exponent problem as follows. Choose a group 
  of prime order p according to the security parameter. 
Let                be chosen at random and g be a 
generator of  . If an adversary is given 
 ⃗               
      
     
     
    
 
         
                   
          
             
       
                                       
           
it must remain hard to distinguish       
       from 
a random element in    .An algorithm  that outputs 
  {   }has advantage   in solving decisional q-parallel 
BDHE in  if 
   [ ( ⃗           
    )   ]        ⃗             
 
Definition 2.1 We say that the (decision) q parallel-
BDHE assumption holds if no polytime algorithm has a 
non-negligible advantage in solving the decisional q-
parallel BDHE problem. 
 
3. CP Attribute-Based Proxy Re-encryption 
3.1 Algorithms of CP-AB-PRE 
 
Fig.1 encryption system 
A CP-AB-PRE scheme consists of the following six 
algorithms:  
Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, RKGen, Reencrypt, and 
Decrypt. 
Setup (  ). This algorithm takes the security parameter 
κ as input and generates a public key PK, a master secret 
key MSK. 
KeyGen(MSK,   ). This algorithm takes MK and a set of 
attributes    as input and generates a secret key      
associated with   . 
Encrypt (        ). This algorithm takes PK, a 
message M, and an access policy    as input, and 
generates a ciphertext     . 
DO 
Enc (PK, M, W1) 
 
User2 
TA Proxy 
Cloud 
User1 User3 
Re-Key 
 
CT-W2, W2 
CT-W1, W1 
SK2 
PK 
M M 
SK1 
RKGen(       ). This algorithm takes a secret key 
     and a set of attributes   as input and generates a re-
encryption key        . 
Reencrypt (               ). This algorithm takes a 
re-encryption key        ， and a ciphertext      as 
input, first checks if the attribute list in    satisfies the 
access policy of     , that is,        . Then, if check 
passes, it generates a re-encrypted ciphertext      ; 
otherwise, it returns  .In addition, it generates the part 
ciphertext     of the policy   
Decrypt (                        ) This algorithm 
takes                associated with   as input and 
returns the message M if the attribute list    satisfies the 
access policy   specified for     , that is,        . 
If         , it would returns   with overwhelming 
probability. 
3.2 Security Model 
We describe the security model called Selective-Policy 
Model for our CP-ABPRE scheme. Based on [30], we 
use the following security game. A CP-AB-PRE scheme 
is selective-policy chosen plaintext secure if no 
probabilistic polynomial time adversary has non-
negligible advantage in the following Selective-Policy 
Game. 
Selective-Policy Game for CP-AB-PRE 
Init: The adversary  commits to the challenge 
ciphertext policy  
 . 
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and 
gives PK to . 
Phase 1:  makes the following queries. 
–  Extract(   
 ):   submits an attribute list   
  for a 
KeyGen query where   
     
 , the challenger gives the 
adversary the secret key      . 
– RKExtract(  
    
 ):  submits an attribute list   
 for a 
RKGen query where  
     
 , the challenger gives the 
adversary the re-encryption key          . 
Challenge:   submits two equal-length messages 
      to the challenger. The challenger flips a random 
coin b and passes the ciphertext Encrypt(        
 )to 
the adversary. 
Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated. 
Guess:  outputs a guess   of b. 
The advantage of  in this game is defined as  
            
     
 
 
   
In [13], Ateniese et al. defined another important 
security notion, named delegator secret security (or 
master key security), for unidirectional PRE. This 
security notion captures the intuition that, even if the 
dishonest proxy colludes with the User2, it is still 
impossible for them to derive the delegator’s private key 
in full. 
We give master key security game for attribute-based 
proxy re-encryption as follows. A CP-AB-PRE scheme 
has selective master key security if no probabilistic 
polynomial time adversary   has a non-negligible 
advantage in winning the following selective master key 
security game. 
Selective Secret Key Security Game 
Init: The adversary  commits to a challenge attribute 
list   
 . 
Setup: The challenger runs the ReKeyGen algorithm 
and gives           to . 
Queries:  makes the following queries. 
–  Extract(   
 ): A submits an attribute list   
  for a 
KeyGen query where   
     , the challenger gives the 
adversary the secret key      . 
– RKExtract(  
    
 ):  submits an attribute list   
  for a 
RKGen query, the challenger gives the adversary the re-
encryption key          . 
Output:  outputs the secret key       for the attribute 
list   
 , then  succeeds. 
The advantage of  in this game is defined as 
                     . 
3.3 Proposed Scheme 
Let   be a bilinear group of prime order p, and let g be a 
generator of  . In addition, let e :        denote 
the bilinear map. Let         be an encoding 
between   and   . A security parameter, κ, will 
determine the size of the groups. Let   {           } 
be a set of attributes;    {           }  be a set of 
possible values associated with      and        ; 
           be an attribute list for a user; and 
            be an access policy. [33] 
Our six algorithms are as follows: 
Setup(  )The setup algorithm takes as input the number 
of attributes in the system. It then chooses a group   of 
prime order p, a generator g and U random group 
elements   ， ，     that are associated with the 
U attributes in the system. In addition, it chooses random 
exponents ，    . 
The public key is published as 
PK = g ;         ;   ;   ， ，   
The authority sets         as the master secret key. 
KeyGen(MSK,  ).The key generation algorithm takes 
as input the master secret key and a set S of attributes. 
The algorithm first chooses a random      . It creates 
the private keyas 
            
                               
  
Encrypt(       ) The encryption algorithm takes as 
input the public parameters PK and a message M to 
encrypt. In addition, it takes as input an LSSS access 
structure          . The function associates rows of 
M to attributes. 
Let   be a     matrix. The algorithm first chooses a 
random vector ⃗⃗                
  .These values will 
be used to share the encryption exponent s. For i = 1 to  , 
it calculates     ⃗⃗     ,where     is the vector 
corresponding to the i th row of   . In addition, the 
algorithm chooses random           . 
The cipher text is published as      : 
                           
    
(     
         
        
  )     
(    
         
        
  )  
along with a description of        . 
RKGen (MSK,     ,   ). The Re-key generation 
algorithm takes as input the MSK,     ,    , choose 
random     ,and compute   
 ,send it to User2 ，send 
    ,and the new private key       to proxy. 
             
             
            
     
   
  
            
        
  
              
     
  
  
  
 
Reencrypt (                ) The Re-encryption 
algorithm takes as input the public parameters 
               to Re-encrypt. In addition, it takes as 
input an LSSS access structure               
        . The function associates rows of    to 
attributes. 
Let   be a     matrix. The algorithm first chooses a 
random vector  ⃗⃗                    
  .These 
values will be used to share the encryption exponent s. 
For i = 1 to  , it calculates   
   ⃗⃗      , where    is 
the vector corresponding to the ith row of   . In 
addition, the algorithm chooses random  
      
    . 
The Re-encryption algorithm then takes as input      . 
Suppose that    satisfies the access structure and let 
   {       } be defined as    {          }   . 
Then, let {     }     be a set of constants such that if 
  are valid shares of any secret s according to  , then  
∑           . 
The cipher text is published as      : 
        
∏                     
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)  
Decrypt(     ，     ；     ,     ).The decryption 
algorithm takes as input a cipher text           for 
access structure                and a private key for a 
set   . Suppose that    satisfies the access structure and 
let    {       } be defined as    {          }  
   {          }. Then, let {  
    }    be a set of 
constants such that if    
 are valid shares of any secret d, 
then  ∑   
   
        
The decryption algorithm first computes 
        ∏ (    
       (  
        
  ))
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The decryption algorithm can then divides out this value 
from C and obtain the message M. 
3.4 Security proof 
Theorem 1 If there is an adversary who breaks our 
scheme in the Selective-Policy model, a simulator can 
take the adversary as oracle and break the DBDH 
assumption with a non-negligible advantage. 
Proof We will show that a simulator   can break the 
DBDH assumption with advantage 
 
 
 if it takes an 
adversary , who can break our scheme in the Selective-
Set model with advantage, as oracle. 
The simulator   creates the following simulation 
Init: The simulator   runs takes in a q-parallel BDHE 
challenge  ⃗ ,T.   gives   a challenge ciphertext 
policy  
 . 
Setup: To provide a public key PK to  ,   chooses 
random      and implicitly sets    
      by 
letting                
 
        
 
. For each x for 
     begin by choosing a random value   .Let X 
denote the set of indices i, such that        .   run the 
program output    as : 
     
   ∏       
       
     
       
    
    
   
 
Finally   sends  the public key. 
Phase 1:  makes the following queries. 
– Extract(   )[33]:   submits an attribute list   
  
            in a secret key query. The attribute list 
must satisfy       
  or else   simply aborts and takes 
a random guess.   generates     
 and sends it to . 
–  RKExtract        :   submits an attribute list 
  
                  and an access policy  
  in a re-
encryption key query. The attribute list must satisfy 
      
  or else   simply aborts and takes a random 
guess. In the same way,   generates     
 and sends it to 
 . 
Then   submits   
 to Extract query and gets a secret 
key     .Then it random choose  
    and compute 
  
  , at last generate the        
  and sends it to . 
Challenge:   submits two challenge messages    
and  .   flips a coin    {   }. It creates 
       
             
     
             
                 
Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated. 
Guess:  outputs a guess   of b.   outputs 1 if and only 
if     . 
Therefore, the advantage of breaking the DBDH 
assumption is 
      |    
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            |                         
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Theorem 2 If there is an adversary who breaks our 
scheme in selective the reencryption key to get User1’s 
    security model, a simulator can take the adversary 
as oracle and solve the DDH problem with a non-
negligible advantage. 
Proof We will show that a simulator   can solve the 
DDH problem with advantage  if it takes an adversary , 
who can break our scheme in the selective the 
reencryption key security model with advantage, as 
oracle. Suppose the proxy colludes with the User2, he 
can get   
  from User2. 
Given a CBDH challenge tuple                          
by the challenger, the simulator   creates the following 
simulation. 
Init: The adversary  commits to a challenge attribute 
list   
 . 
Setup: To provide a public key PK to ,  generate  
PK = g ;         
 
;   
 
;   ， ，   
Queries:  makes the following queries. 
–  Extract(   
 ):   submits an attribute list    for a 
KeyGen query where   
     , the challenger gives the 
adversary the secret key      . 
             
    
             
 
                 
   
– RKExtract(  
    
 ):  submits an attribute list   
  for a 
RKGen query, The challenger runs the ReKeyGen 
algorithm. Challenger choose randomly      , 
computes   
  , then gives   
             to . 
           
      
 
  
      
              
 
  
     
           
     
    
   
Output:  outputs the secret key       for the attribute 
list   
 , then  succeeds. 
The advantage of  in this game is defined as 
                     . 
If the proxy collude with the User2, he can get   
   from 
User2, then he can get        
 
  
      
            
   
 
                 
  ,      is as follows: 
         
￠
←     (  
     
     
    )            
￠
←     (  
     
     
 )   
4. Discussions 
4.1 Re-Outsourcing Computation Reduction 
In our scheme, the User1 can finish the process of proxy. 
If we omit the proxy, not only User1but also User2 
would increase the amount of computation. We will use 
the third party. We can also outsource the policy of 
  .The algorithm is as follows. 
TransformKeyGenout(MSK;    ) The algorithm runs 
KeyGen(MSK;    ) to obtain             
        
  
       
       
     
  
  
  
. It chooses a random value     
 . It sets 
the transformation key TK as 
         
                  
     
  
  
    
. 
and the private key SK as ( ;TK). 
After Re-outsourcing , user2 get 
           
    
     
        
           
  
Finally, User2 get   
 
     
  
4.2 Re-encryption Control 
Note that if the User1 does not provide   
  in ciphertext, 
the original decryption is not affected but the decryption 
of re-encrypted ciphertext cannot go on. That’s because 
  
  is only used in re-encrypted step, which is used in 
CP-policy. So she can control whether the ciphertext can 
be re-encrypted. In the same way, the proxy can also 
decide whether the re-encrypted ciphertext can be re-
encrypted. 
4.3 Extra Access Control 
Our schemes try to allow the proxy to add extra access 
policy when re-encrypting ciphertext. For example, 
supposing the proxy can re-encrypt ciphertext under 
policy from    to   , he can add an extra access 
policy  to the re-encrypted ciphertext such that only 
user whose attribute list L simultaneously satisfies    
and  can decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext.  
1. For a re-encryption key pair, choose a new   
 
←    , 
compute new re-encryption key pair. 
2. To decrease the amount of computation, add 
Encrypt        
        to the re-encrypted ciphertext. 
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